Book Review: Nehru’s Himalayan Blunders: The Accession of Jammu and Kashmir
Let us begin by trying to understand the term “blank”.
Anything shocking, coming to you with suddenness, can leave you blank for a few moments. For instance, witnessing an accident, hearing some really disturbing news etc., can leave you blank. Or when you are in a perfect state of meditation, you go blank; something we all yearn for, but seldom achieve.
But there is another situation, when you go “blank”.
It is when you hear shocking news, which is then followed by bad news. And when that bad news is followed by worse news and the messenger then goes on to heap further bad news. And then he goes on – and you lose count.
In a lighter vein, you can go “blank” when you are told that a well-trained pilot has flew a plane and landed it safely in difficult situation, despite causing quite a bit of damage to the plane. And when you rush to salute the pilot, a child comes out of the cockpit!
This is what readers will experience going through the pages of Nehru’s Himalayan Blunders: The Accession of Jammu and Kashmir by Justice S N Aggarwal, published by Garuda Prakashan.
There is a purpose why governance systems are put in place. Keeping the larger national interest and greatest common good in mind, such systems help keep the personal foibles of any one of them in check.
But, this book lays bare Nehru as not only a man with foibles, but also as somebody having scant respect for the systems of governance.
And, when the book tells you that person also does not understand a simple thing like “sovereignty” – either political or territorial – then, you are left “blank”.
(Imagine, a certain Mr Narendra Modi meeting Imran Khan in Lahore and, committing to UN that he would not cross the LoC, despite gravest provocation!)
Not to have administrative experience is one thing. But not realising that there is a thing called territorial sovereignty is not what is expected of the first Prime Minister of any nation; especially, if he claims to have been in public, political life for many decades and interacting with great leaders of his time.
How would you react when you know that your Prime Minister makes international commitment on a foreign soil, in the presence of the enemy country’s Prime Minister and on the advice of a representative of the same colonial power, which you are supposed to have defeated? Not only that, you go ahead and make this commitment over radio – without your cabinet colleagues even getting the whiff of it.
In fact, the book makes it difficult to fathom as to whether Nehru even understood what a nation meant.
Otherwise, what explains him relying on Lord Mountbatten, a representative of the colonial forces we fought, for advice on every little thing – while completely ignoring Sardar Patel and other cabinet colleagues?
As a student of Political Science during college, one was told that India’s foreign policy at that time was—“Nehru knows best”.
This book tells us that Nehru never really knew anything.
Would you not go “blank” when you know that your Prime Minister has taken something as crucial as the Kashmir matter to the UNO (in complete disregard to his colleague’s views and without even consultation) – and then, suddenly gets “shocked” that UNO is just an avenue for power politics at the world level? Was he expecting angels in the UNO?
Actually, one can keep on going. The author lists 16 directly identifiable blunders – the details is for the readers to know.
But “Nehru’s Himalayan Blunders…” is not only about Nehru.
The real success of the book lies in the details – brought in the form of letters quoted directly from their authors, including Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru and Sardar Patel; complete documents quoted verbatim like the Instrument of Accession, the complaint made to the United Nations, its resolutions; personal correspondences from not only Nehru and Sardar Patel, but also between Lord Louis Mountbatten (especially, his views on Nehru) and the British King.
Besides, the book also quotes from the books written by people, who were in the thick of things when Kashmir was passing through one of its most turbulent phase – like Mehr Chand Mahajan (the then Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir), Mirpuri, Lt Gen S K Sinha (who was posted in Kashmir after Indian Army was sent to Kashmir for its protection and ousting the invaders); Campbell-Johnson (press attaché of Lord Mountbatten) and many others.
With a legal background, the author, a former Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, does away with decorative language. But, to his credit, he also does not burden it with legalese.
In fact, it is when the facts are served cold – in black and white – that it hits us the most. It is in these words that you go “blank”.
Consider this – ‘Mirpuri adds: “Since Hindus and Sikhs migrating from adjacent areas had taken shelter in Mirpur in large numbers and since Mirpur was protected by a battalion of the J&K Army, Muslims residing in Mirpur and neighbouring areas had already gone to Pakistan even before October 27. But the Nehru Govt sitting in Delhi did nothing to take administrative and military control even after the merger formalities were completed. Nearly 25,000 Hindus and Sikhs were trapped in Mirpur. However, when Pakistani learnt of the diversion of the Indian Army towards Uri, it stepped up aggression towards Mirpur”.’ The books tells us that around a lakh of Hindus and Sikhs were killed in what became Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK).
The following paragraph has this to say about Nehru’s speech, made on November 25, 1947: “The facts are well-known and redound to the credit of our military organisation…We have gone to Kashmir to protect the people and as soon as this duty is discharged, our forces need not remain there and we shall withdraw our forces…”
Quoting from Mountbatten’s own correspondences to the British King (which he would write in personal capacity after getting readily available nod from Nehru, even after India became independent), the author tells us what Mountbatten thought of Nehru.
“I am glad to say that Nehru has not been put in charge of the new States Departments, which would have wrecked everything. Sardar Patel, who is essentially a realist and very sensible, is going to take it over. Even better news is that V. P. Menon is to be its secretary. By this means, I think, we shall avoid a really bad break with the states with all the endless repercussions that this would have entailed,” Lord Mountbatten wrote in his personal report (Page 163).
(“States Department” was created to deal with the issue of integration of princely states with what was known as “British India” before independence. Sardar Patel headed it and sorted out all the issues. Jammu and Kashmir was the only state, which Nehru dealt with.)
Given that Nehru was childish enough to rush to Mahatma Gandhi to complain against Sardar Patel (and felt that Prime Minister was virtually an authority unto himself), even after becoming the Prime Minister, this assessment of Mountbatten should have been a laughable matter.
But, when the book tells you that Nehru agreed to go to the United Nations, just because Mountbatten suggested so in presence of Liaquat Ali Khan (Pakistan Prime Minister) in Lahore (an enemy territory by then); and Nehru did not even bother to seek a token approval from the Cabinet, that is when you are left “blank”.
The very question as to “how-can-this-be” loses significance; because such “blunders” were committed by the dozens.
And then to be obsessed about just one person in the entire country (nay world?)! Of course, the name is Sheikh Abdullah!
Nehru, the book shows in no uncertain terms, would only have it from Abdullah – everybody else, for him, was wrong, unreliable and biased. So much so that, even his life’s biggest decision – the accession of Jammu and Kashmir – was made only after Abdullah gave the nod.
And how?
The book tells us (paraphrased): Abdullah was sitting in an adjacent room, when Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, the then Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir representing Maharaja Hari Singh, desperately wanted India to accept accession. Nehru became angry and asked him to leave. Abdullah then sent a slip asking Nehru to agree to accession and send Army in Kashmir. Nehru changed his mind.
Such an obsession at a personal level can be excused. But, when it comes to a nation, communities, peoples and their very survival, such obsession is not only criminal, but assumes psychopathic dimensions. A Prime Minister can’t be imagined doing this.
There are many other stories of the love story, as it were, between him and Abdullah in the book, which only did one thing – suck the blood of innocent civilians (read Hindus and Sikhs).
To cap it, the book also tells you how it was Mountbatten, who got even Gandhi to reverse the cabinet decision – of not giving Rs 55 crore to Pakistan, in the wake of it waging war in Kashmir – by going on fast unto death. Sardar Patel broke down in the meeting when the approval was made.
And, it is this connection between Mountbatten and Nehru (and, by default, Gandhi, and Edwina), which makes the photograph on the cover of this book extremely relevant – an aged single man trying to charm an elderly lady, while her husband looks away, probably, relaxed in the knowledge that “I have got the hang of you”.
With a side-kick like Nehru, Mountbatten virtually had the entire country to himself.
In fact, the readers will find more about the role of Mountbatten in this book, particularly in complicating the matters. The success of a book does not only lie in how well it tells a fact, but also how it opens new possibilities for deeper scrutiny – in this case, the role of Mountbatten in complicating Kashmir matter.
In their book “Freedom at Midnight”, French-American author-duo of Dominique Lapierre and Larry Collins has devoted an entire chapter on how the astrologers were angry about August 15, 1947, being the date of independence. They said it was inauspicious.
We all know the episodes that followed independence, leading to spilling of bloods of millions – proving the astrologers right to a large extent.
Reading this book, the reader may conclude that, when it came to Nehru, they could have made a similar prediction, without running the risk of being proved completely wrong.
As shows this book, it was no less a miracle that a badly battered India, in general, and a brutalised Kashmir, in particular, survived Nehru.
Book Review: Nehru’s Himalayan Blunders: The Accession of Jammu and Kashmir
Author: Justice S N Aggarwal
Publisher: Garuda Prakashan
Pages: 472
Price: Rs. 699
BUY NOW : https://garudabooks.com/nehrus-himalayan-blunders
Prashant Pandey a former journalist for nearly two decades, with wide ranging experience. He is a freelancer now and is interested in looking at things from the Indic point-of-view. His area of interests includes society, history, politics, culture and films, besides cricket.