The battle of Chamb was a crucial battle fought between the two countries. Before the war, the area of Chamb was under Bharat’s control, The town holds immense strategic value.
In the 1965 war, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik had swiftly moved his men and machinery into Chamb in Pakistan’s Operation Grand Slam. Somehow, Bharat then, had not given Chamb its due importance and had stationed only a single Infantry Brigade there, with a squadron of outdated French AMX -13 tanks. Pakistan massively outgunned Bharat with its two armoured regiments and modern American Patton tanks.
But in 1971, things had changed and now Chamb had an infantry division with two border Security Force battalions, heavy fortification and Russian T – 54(55 tanks) to guard it.
Chamb town was shielded from the Pakistan army by two ridges, parallel to each other, in the North of Chamb, known as Mandiala North and South. Additionally, River Tawi caused another obstacle for the Pakistanis, though in Winter, it turned relatively shallow.
Bharat’s 10 Infantry Division was defending Chamb with 104 tanks, (90 of them were of Russian made). Pakistan’s 23 Divisions possessed 129 tanks ( out of which only 74 were T – 59s and the rest were Sherman 11/M – 36/B2) and they had been asked to wrench the area from Bharat, using it.
The Pakistani artillery had 130 guns in all, whereas Bharat had 126, only four short in number but the Pakistani as well as the Bharatiya Military analysts were of the opinion that Bharat’s Russian made tanks were technically superior. America had stopped giving Military aids to Pakistan after 1965.
On the 3rd of December, the Pakistan Air Force bombarded the area and by nightfall, the 66 Brigade attacked the Bharatiya territory and seized it to a depth of 3000 yards.
Similarly, the 111 Brigade of Pakistan, had been assigned the identical task of capturing the Moel village in Bharatiya territory and later the Chhamb town. However, after the initial hick up, the Bharatiya army stopped it’s winning march.
The battle of Mandiala was of prime significance. The Bharatiya army had assumed that Pakistan would attack from the Southern direction and hence had not deployed sufficient armour to protect Dewa Mandiala and the passage leading into Bharatiya territory remained unattended.
The 11 Cavalry group captured Gurha, the very next morning.
Bharatiya Commanding officer and 4 other officers of 7 Kumaon’s O group were martyred. Meanwhile, the tank troops of Deccan Horse and 5 Sikhs heroic exhibition enabled Bharatiyas to keep their hold over Mandiala South.
In the next two days, Pakistan’s 13 AK Battalion captured the Mandalia bridge. But, once again, the 9 Horse of Bharat, resurrected and baffled Pakistani battalion’s attempts of crossing their tanks through river Tawi, into Bharatiya territory.
The rejuvenated Bharatiya, once again took the control and the 26 Cavalry Squadron of Pakistan, was prevented from advancing into Bharat. They lost three tanks too.
Pakistan’s very prominent strategist, Major General Eftikhar Khan Januja, again had to redesign his plans, to seize Chamb.
His new plan was not to engage Bharatiya troops but to locate the gaps in Bharat’s defences.
The Bharatiya army had left an opening in its minefield, between Barsala and Jhanda. Pakistani war analysts feel that Bharat had created these gaps to enable their soldiers to invade Pakistani territory through it.
That was exact what Pakistan had been looking for. They entered Bharatiya territory through it and by the evening of 6th December, annexed Chak Pandit.
Bharat had not expected that the Pakistani forces would take the South route of the Mandiala bridge and come up from Jaimal Kot. Thus, Bharatiya army miscalculated and on the morning of 6th of December, Pakistan’s 23 Baluch captured the ill defences Bakan and Paur.
On the same evening, Pakistan’s 4 AK Brigade captured Mandiala South, after a tough two day battle with 5 Sikh.
Later, in the same evening, the GOC of Bharat’s 10 Division, decided to concede the western bank of the Tawi and thus, ordered the 191 Brigade to withdraw to the eastern bank of the river.
The crucial Mandiala bridge was destroyed at midnight. The withdrawal of Bharat opened the path for Pakistan to walk into Chamb, Brigadier Saeed Ismat was the first Pakistani to set foot in Chamb but he did face resistance from the Bharatiy Air Force.
Radio Pakistan had announced that ‘Chamb had fallen to our valiant forces.’, when the 2 Armoured Brigade ‘was barely at Chak Pandit.’ When Brigadier Ismat and Captain Tarique, flew over Chamb, the next morning, they found that the Pakistani troops were atleast two miles southeast of Chamb.
When they landed their aircraft in a grassy field in Chamb, the small town was deserted. They switched off the engine and began a long wait for the Pakistani troop to arrive. Eventually, they entered the Bharatiya Brigade Command post. When they returned back to where the aircraft was parked, four Bharatiya SU-7 were throwing all sorts of munitions.
Later, in the late afternoon, the 10 Baluch entered Chamb.
Pakistan’s 111 Brigade was instructed to move further into the Pallawala Jauriafi area. General Iftikhar Januja, a very efficient head of the army staff of the Pakistani army, had planned this attack to the core but he was not destined to witness his own strategy resulting in success. His helicopter crashed on the evening of 9 th December and later, he succumbed to the injury.
Post his demise, the ‘officiating’ charge was handed over to Brigadier Kamal Matin of 28 Cavalry. Only 28 tanks were left, in action, as armoured components, in the Pakistan attack, after the operation at Chamb.
The infantry attack started an hour after the midnight of the 9th December and in the wee hours of the 10th, opposite the Darh and Raipur ferries. Bharat succeeded in restraining the bridge head.
But, the Pakistanis committed a series of mistakes.
The 28 Cavalry regiment had succeeded in crossing River Tawi and had asked 111 Brigade for support, which was refused by Major Nazar Hussain, with the assumption that 28 Cavalry had only four tanks left.
In the afternoon of the 10th December, Pakistani top brass ordered 111 Brigade to withdraw!!! 28 Cavalry was also asked to evacuate the region, to the West of River Tawi and concentrate on the Singri area.
It seemed the strategies applied by Pakistani regiments lacked harmony and on more than one occasion, the lack of synchronisation among the army, dismantled the probable leads.
As commented by Col Tauqeer ul Islam, “These were strange orders because till 12th December, the entire area upto Pallanwala remained un-occupied by Indian forces.”
Major Agha Humayun Amin later mentioned – “The battle of Chamb, was a battle of lost opportunities.”
Pakistan, in Daruchiah, faced a disastrous setback after an initial success in Poonch. Daruchiah, is the mountainous terrain, in a conical shape, located near LoC, in the Poonch sector, blocking the Balnoi region of the Kotli – Balnoi road.
The Bharatiya army took an offensive position along the LOC and seized Nangi Tekri, Jungle Tekri and Bump.
It prevented the Pakistan army from utilising Kotli – Madarpur – Hajira road in hitherto occupied Kashmir.
The salient battles fought in Jammu Kashmir and in the neighbouring Punjab were at Chamb (December 6-10), Laleai – Picquet 707 (December 3-8), the defence of Poonch (December 3-7), Thanapir (December 4-5), Gutrian (December 3-7), Banwat (December 3-4), Nangi Tekri (December 10-11), Turtok, Ladakh (December 7-17), Brachil Pass and Wali Malik (December 7-12), Basantar River (December 5-17) and Samba (numerous days in 1971).
Pakistan continues to occupy much of Chamb, till date. Several thousand Hindus and Sikhs fled Chamb and sought refuge in other parts of Jammu district.
Bharat had made gains in the areas, like Ladakh, where it had taken the retaliatory initiatives. It regained Turtuk, which it had lost in 1947-48.
The bilateral agreement was signed between Bharat and Pakistan by the then Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, on July 3 1972.
During the Shimla agreement, Bharat returned most of the conquered territory but retained Turtuk.
In order to initiate and establish durable peace, both governments agreed on three points as follows :
A) Bharatiya and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of international border;
B) In Jammu-Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual difference and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat of the use of force in violation of this line.
C) The withdrawal of forces and exchange of the prisoners of war (POWs) shall commence upon enforcement of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of thirty days thereof.
Madhvi Bhuta is the National Executive of BJP Mahila Morcha and a Columnist on various Forums.
