1965 Indo-Pak Conflict: From Ceasefire to Capture of Haji Pir Pass

The ceasefire on the 1st of January 1949 indicated the end of the war, but did nothing to strengthen the relationship between the two countries.

Pandit Nehru offered a ‘No war pact,’ but Pakistan refused to sign the pact, on the pretext of an ‘honorable solution to the Kashmir issue.’ It depicted their determination never to let the subject (Kashmir solution) die. The constant insurgencies created war-like situations, and their eventual purpose was to defeat Bharat.

Since Independence, Bharat had adopted the Socialist structure of Democracy, aligning with Soviet Russia’s political system.

In the early Fifties, the United States of America, to restrain the Soviet Union and curb its spread of Communism, established regional Military organizations like the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).

The member countries were to pour in resources (mainly manpower) for the collective defense of the area against the Soviet threat.

In return, the United States pledged to assist the member states, economically and militarily, and as a result, Pakistan strengthened its armed forces at negligible expense. It joined the CENTO and SEATO in 1955 and in the span of a decade received military aid worth Rs.1.5 billion $. The armaments included F104 Fighter aircraft, Sabre jets, MI rifles, Universal Machine guns, recoilless rifles, Patton tanks, guns, and every other defense equipment. The Pakistan army was trained in Britain, the United States, and joint military exercises were carried out.

The armed forces were extremely powerfully equipped and hence, they imposed their impact on the political system of their nation too, and had taken over the Pakistan Government, post a Military coup in October 1958. General Ayub Khan became the new president.

The Redcliff demarcation and later, Maharaja Harisinh’s decision for Jammu and Kashmir’s accession with Bharat, had not gone well with Pakistan.

In mid-1965, Pakistan again began to stir up a rebellion to oust the Bharatiyas as well as ablaze the issue back onto the international agenda.

On April 9th, 1965, Fifty-one Infantry Brigade of the Pakistani army crossed the International border into the Rann of Kutch and seized the Sardar post near Kanjarkot. Within fifteen days, Pakistan attacked one more time, with tanks and artillery, and captured four more posts and the entire Kanjarkot area.

Soon after occupying the Kanjarkot region, Pakistan offered to negotiate. Bharat point-blank refused that there would be no negotiation till Pakistan vacated the illegally captured and occupied land.

However, the then Prime Minister of Bharat, Lalbahadur Shastri met Ayub Khan in Britain during the Commonwealth meeting.

Under the arbitrary influence of the then-British Prime Minister, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the two countries. Following the agreement, Pakistan agreed to withdraw its forces and restore Bharatiya control over the area, and in return, Bharat would have to permit Pakistan to use a road constructed in Bharatiya territory.

Along with the invasion of Kutch, Ayub Khan initiated a number of violations on the ceasefire line (CFL). It was soon followed by Pakistan launching an operation at Kargil in Kashmir to dismantle the Srinagar – Leh highway. The infiltrators from Pakistan’s side crossed over the CFL and occupied three high hill spots (Tiger Hill, Tololing, and Pt 4875), and established observation posts. Using these observation posts, they targeted precise artillery firing on the highway and disrupted the traffic.

Bharat forwarded a complaint to the United Nations, but no immediate steps were taken to cease it. Then, the Bharatiya army took charge launching an operation to evict the infiltrators, on the 17th of May 1965. However, seeing Bharat’s firm action, the UN posted their observers in the area, and eventually, the positions were vacated in June 1965.

While the ceasefire was being violated by Pakistan, in Kutch the Bharatiya army and the Government of Bharat were engrossed in terminating the ceasefire violation. Pakistan took advantage of Bharat’s digression and attempted to capture Jammu-Kashmir.

Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who had been a Military dictator and had later become the president of Pakistan, had been implementing the plan in total secrecy. Very few ministers of his council of Ministers knew about what was being transpired. Field Marshal Ayub Khan had not taken the chiefs of the Pakistani Navy and Air Force, into confidence and had consulted only the head of the army, General Musa Khan.

Jammu & Kashmir share the longest International border with Pakistan. In 1947-48, Pakistan’s attack on Bharat, a little after obtaining independence, resulted in the illegal occupation of a part of the region of Jammu-Kashmir by Pakistan. The then political environment had kept the issue unsolved and lingering, and the 750-kilometer-long ‘line of control’ was then known as the ‘ceasefire line’ (CFL). The massive terrain contained mountains and ridges, thus it was an immensely difficult task for armed forces to guard every inch.

The infiltrators formed small groups and crossed over the CFL, through the gap between Bharatiya patrolling. Their strategy was to adopt to clandestine infiltration of a large number of guerrilla soldiers (the officials of the Pakistani army as well as the non-commissioned officers.) and the operation was coded as Operation Gibraltar.

The infiltrators were provided with an enormous supply of arms and food. They were equipped with updated communication gadgets and Bharatiya currency. The designated infiltrators were to penetrate in small groups and mingle with the local crowds gathered for a celebration of the festival of Pir Dastagir Sahib. They also became part of the crowd assembled to demonstrate against the imprisonment of Shaikh Abdullah.

Of course, the plan was bold and risky, but the Pakistani authority had relied on the support from the local Kashmiri population, on the pretext of brotherhood of religious similarity.

The infiltrators were organized into eight ‘forces’ that comprised Six companies of 110 men. In most cases, the companies were commanded by Pakistan army officers of the Major ranking, while the platoon commanders were junior commissioned officers (of sergeant and below) or senior non-commissioned officers. (sergeant and above).

On August 5th, two infiltrators in Green Salwar Kameez approached a youth near Gulmarg and attempted to bribe him with some money, in order to get some information.

The young and aware Bharatiya Kashmiri, Ch. Muhammad Din, a Gurjar from Tangmarg, was the first to inform the Bharatiya Government about the suspicious presence of infiltrators. Similarly, many Muslims from Jammu as well as Kashmir passed on vital indications to the Bharatiya army. Later, Pakistani terrorists assassinated Ch. Din due to his loyalty to Bharat. Similarly, some infiltrators, on the same day, approached a local man in the Mendhar region for some information. The modus operandi was identical. The local Kashmiri too, reported the matter to the brigade headquarters. The similarity of both the incidents alerted the Bharatiya army, and they seized the two Pakistani officers near Narain. Their interrogation divulged the entire plan.

Thus, the security forces across the state were alarmed and a counter-operation to decimate the intruders was activated immediately.

It was evident that the bright yet perilous plan was designed with the hope of gaining local support to execute the mission but here, is where the Pakistani strategists failed, and their plan misfired. Without local support, they were completely demoralized and had nowhere to go. They were stalked and gradually their movements came under the scrutiny of the Bharatiya army. Few of them surrendered. A massive quantum of arms and ammunition was captured, and Operation Gibraltar collapsed by August 12th.

While the mopping and cleansing up operations were going on, the then Hon. Prime Minister Lalbahadur Shastri made an unambiguous statement. He announced that if necessary, Bharat may attack the raider’s bases and the battle can go on, till the results are achieved. He added, “Bharat cannot go on pushing the Pakistanis off its territory. If infiltration continues, we will have to carry the fight to the other side.

The Bharatiya army had also commented that the only way to stop infiltration was to retaliate by crossing the CFL valiantly and destroying the routes utilized by the raiders and the areas used by their supporters.

This plan was made operational in the Kargil sector on August 15, 1965.

The Bharatiya troops crossed the CFL and recaptured the three Pakistani positions, which were seized first and then vacated by them in May. Some hills in the Uri and Tithwal sectors were also captured.

The Haji Pir pass was the most significant of these and at that time, was governed by the Pakistani army. The country that occupied this pass could control an area of around 3,500 square kilometers as It linked Poonch and Rajouri sectors (both in Jammu) with Uri (Kashmir).

Prior to 1947, a wide metalled highway connected Kashmir and Jammu through the Haji Pir.

Pakistan began to attack the Bharatiya positions in Tithwal, Uri, and Poonch in mid-August of 1965. To halt the continuous torture inflicted by the Pakistani army, it was essential to take command over the Haji Pir Pass.

The task of capturing Haji Pir Pass and the Bulge was given to 19 Infantry Division, and the corps reserve of 68 infantry brigade was placed under the command of 19 Infantry Division for the operation. It was code-named O P Bakshi. 25 infantry divisions were given the task of linking up with the force from Poonch under the code name of O P FAULAD.

The following troops were placed under the command of the 68 Infantry Brigade for the capture of Haji Pir Pass.

1 PARA, 19 PUNJAB, 4 RAJPUT, JAK RIFLES, 4 SIKH LIGHT INFANTRY, 164 Field Regiment less one battery (12 field guns), 144 Mountain Battery (6 howitzers), B Troop 39 Medium Regiment (3 medium guns), 18 Field Battery (6 Field guns), One Section of 4.2-inch mortars.

About one brigade of the enemy including some POK battalions controlled the Haji Pir Bulge.

On August 26th, the mission commenced, and the 68 Brigade crossed the CFL in two columns. 1 PARA crossed to the west and advanced attack on Sank around 21.30 pm; They were commanded under Brigadier Z C Bakshi and were well prepared with defenses of barbed wire and mines.

The then Brigadier Z C Bakshi (later, General) is one of the highly acclaimed as well as immensely ‘decorated’ soldiers and Military geniuses of independent Bharat.

It was pouring heavily, yet the troops reached the difficult top of the feature at 04.15 AM, the next morning.

The entire attack was held in utter silence, and the enemy was completely surprised. They fled the battlefield, leaving behind their heavy armaments. They continued their exploitation, denying any chance to the Pakistani army to reorganize for retaliation.

They rushed to Sar, the next feature, and captured it by 09.30 hours on August 28th. They carried on their ambush, and all surrounding areas, including the Ledi Wali Gali, were under the control of the Bharatiya army by 18:00 p.m. on August 28th.

Major Ranjit Dayal, the hero of the battle, immediately proceeded to accomplish the most significant task of seizing the Haji Pir Pass.

On reaching the foot of the pass, Major Dayal took a call to leave the track and climb up the rarely used, longer route of Uri – Poonch road. By 04.30 AM, they reached the disused Uri – Poonch road, and that is when Major Dayal allowed his men to take a short nap.

Within half an hour, they resumed towards their goal, and by 06.00 AM, they had reached just below the pass.

They had come straight under the fire from the enemy, and Pakistani soldiers began attacking them. Leaving the lending platoon and the artillery officer to engage the enemy, Major Dayal took the rest of his men to the right, climbed the western shoulder of the Pass, and towered above the pass. They rolled down from the height of the pass and caught the Pakistani soldiers unaware. They were shell-shocked and escaped, leaving their weapons.

Thus, the 1 PARA captured the Pass around 10.30 AM on August 28th, and the Bharatiya Tiranga was fluttering proudly on the Haji Pir Pass.

In less than forty-eight hours, Bharat had captured the critical Pakistan-controlled border ‘posts’ such as Bedori (13,000 ft), Burfi Pathri, Kutthanar ki Galli, and Safikh.

After 1947, Poonch in Jammu was not well connected by road with Uri (in Kashmir). Immediately, post this skirmish, the Bharatiya army began the construction. It seized around thirty Pakistani posts and linked these two frontier towns, Poonch and Uri with one another.

Now, Bharat was well-prepared to conquer the attackers, and hence, Pakistan was left with only two options. To admit the defeat of their guerrilla operation or to execute a full-fledged war against Bharat.

It selected the latter. Continue Reading: The Untold Story of The 1965 India-Pakistan War: The Battle of Sialkot And Asal Uttar

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